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REPORTING SUBSTANTIAL RISKS UNDER
SECTION 8(e) OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES
CONTROL ACT
JONATHAN S. KAI-]AN*
The Toxic Substances Control Act' (hereinafter TSCA or the Act) was
signed by President Ford on October 11, 1976. The Act was passed by
Congress in response to the growing concern over the pervasive spread and
enduring nature of chemicals in our environment. 2 About two million
chemical compounds are presently known 3 and over 9,000 of these com-
pounds are in commercial use in amounts exceeding 1,000 pounds annu-
ally.' TSCA is designed to regulate those chemical substances and mixtures
that present a hazard to health or the environment. The Act is not in-
tended to make our society free of all 'risks presented by chemicals; rather,
it seeks to control only those chemicals presenting unreasonable risks or
imminent hazards. 5
The primary methods chosen by Congress to regulate and control
toxic substances are the requirement for premarket notification of new
chemicals, 6 testing requirements,' the authority to regulate unreasonable
risks and imminent hazards, 8 and the requirement for recordkeeping and
*B.A., j.D., George Washington University. Member of District of Columbia Bar. The
author is an attorney practicing in Washington D.C. with the firm of Hogan & Hartson.
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
Id. at § 2601.
3 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TOXIC SUBSTANCES 3 (1971). This report is re-
printed in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OE THE Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL. Ac,', 757 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HisToul].
Id. In 1973, production of the top 50 chemicals alone totalled 410 billion pounds.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES CON.
CERN1NG SELECTED HIGH VOLUME CHEMICALS (1975), H.R. Rill.. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess,
3 (1975), reprinted in LEGisi.ATivE HisToitv,supra note 3, at 411 11.3,
5 TSCA § 2(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1976), states that one of the major purposes
behind the Act is to provide that
adequate authority should exist to regulate chemical substances and mixtures
which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, and
to take action with respect to chemical substances and mixtures which are immi-
nent hazards.
TSCA § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1976), provides that any person planning to man-
ufacture, process or import a new chemical substance for commercial purposes or apply an
existing chemical substance to a significant new use must notify the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) Administrator at least 90 (lays in advance.
TSCA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976). Under § 4, the EPA Administrator must require
the testing of a chemical substance if he finds that; (1) the chemical may present an unreason-
able risk of injury to health or the environment; (2) there is insufficient information to assess
the effects of use of the chemical; and (3) testing is required to develop such data. Id. 4(a),
15 U.S.C. § 2603(a). Testing is also required when, inter alma, a substance is to be produced in
substantial quantities and it reasonably may be anticipated that there will be extensive en-
vironmental exposure, Id. § 4(a)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B)(i).
'Id. 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605. Section 6 provides that if the EPA Administrator "finds that
there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing, distribution in com-
merce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture ... presents or will present an un-
reasonable risk of injury to health or the environment," he must regulate the substance to the
extent necessary. Id, § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). The Administrator is directed to impose the
least burdensome requirement to adequately protect against the risk, including the options of
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reporting of information that a chemical product presents a substantial risk
of injury to health or the environment. 9 It is this last requirement, concern-
ing substantial risk notification, upon which this article will focus."'
The substantial risk notification requirement is contained in section
8(e) of TSCA. Section 8(e) provides that:
Any person who manufactures, processes, or distributes in
commerce a chemical substance or mixture and who obtains in-
formation which reasonably supports the conclusion that such
substance or mixture presents a substantial risk of injury to
health or the environment shall immediately inform the Admin-
istrator of such information unless such person has actual knowl-
edge that the Administrator has been adequately informed of
such information."
This provision is modeled after similar notification requirements in the
Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) 12 and the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.' 3 Accordingly, the TSCA notification re-
halting manufacture, processing and distribution of the substance, or limiting the amount
which may be manufactured, processed or distributed in commerce. M. § 6(a)(2)(A), (B), 15
U.S.C. § 2605(a)(2)(A), (B). The regulation of a chemical under § 6 must .be by rule in a
rulemaking proceeding. Id. § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
Imminent hazards are regulated under § 7, which authorizes the Administrator to in-
itiate a civil action in an appropriate United States district court for seizure of an imminently
hazardous chemical or for relief against a manufacturer or distributor of the chemical. Id.
7(a)(I)(A), (B), 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a)(1)(A), (B). If the Administrator has not yet made an im-
mediately effective rule as provided by § 6(d)(2)(A)(i), § 7(a)(2), requires the Administrator to
initiate such a suit. 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a)(2). Section 7(d), provides that, where appropriate, the
Administrator shall initiate a rulemaking procedure pursuant to § 6. 15 U.S.C. § 2606(d). A
risk associated with a chemical substance or mixture is an imminent hazard if it is likely to re-
sult in serious or widespread injury to health or the environment before a final rule protecting
against an unreasonable risk can he promulgated under § 6. TSCA § 7(f), 15 U.S.C. § 2606(1).
9 TSCA § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (1976). Under § 8(a), EPA may promulgate rules requir-
ing reports on all chemicals produced in the United States including information on use, ex-
posure, and environmental and health effects. Id. § 8(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(2).
'° For a more general review of TSCA, its origins and its purposes, see Druley and
Ordway, The Toxic Substances Control Act, (BNA 1977); Symposium, Hazardous Substances in the
Environment: Law and Policy, 7 ECOLOGY L. Q. 207-677 (1978); Gaynor, The Toxic Substances
Control Act: A Regulatory Morass, 30 VANn. L. REV. 1149 (1977); Olpin, Policing Toxic Chemicals,
1976 UTAH L. REv. 85; Zeiler, The Toxic Substances Control Act: Federal Regulation of Commercial
Chemicals, 32 Bus. LAW. 1685 (1977); Note, Risk-Benefit Analysis and Technology-Forcing Under The
Toxic Substances Control Act, 62 IOWA L. Rix. 942 (1977).
" 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1976).
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976). Section 15(b) of the CPSA provides:
Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in commerce, and
every distributor and retailer of such product, who obtains information which
reasonably supports the conclusion that such product—
(1) fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule;
or
(2) contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard
described in subsection (a)(2) of this section,
shall immediately inform the Commission of such failure to comply or of such
defect, unless such manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has actual knowledge
that the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect or failure to
comply.
hl. § 2064(b) (1976). There are also similar defect notification provisions in the Radiation Con-
trol for Health and Safety Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 263(g) (1970).
13 Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 113, 80 Stat. 725 (1966) (now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1411
(1976) ). Section 113 of the 1966 Act provided that:
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quirement raises many of the same questions of interpretation faced by
persons subject to those acts.
The primary questions of interpretation raised by section 8(e) are: (I)
who is required to report under this provision; (2) when will a person be
regarded as having obtained information triggering the reporting require-
ment; (3) what constitutes a substantial risk; (4) what kinds of information
reasonably support the existence of a substantial risk; and (5) what are the
requirements to report in connection with information received prior to the
effective date of the Act. This article will first consider and attempt to an-
swer each of these questions of interpretation, drawing primarily upon re-
cent interpretative statements by the Environmental Protection Agency. In
this light, the article will then turn to the actual mechanics of reporting
substantial risks under section 8(e), as well as the various civil and criminal
penalties for failing to so report. Finally, this article will conclude with a
discussion of the consequences to a TSCA-regulated business of complying
with the notification requirement of section 8(e).
I. INTERPRETING SECTION 8(e)
As it has done with many other statutory provisions which are broadly
and vaguely drafted, Congress has left the specifics and details of section
8(e) to be fleshed out by an administrative body. That body is the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, and it has responded to section 8(e)'s lack
of substance by issuing its Section 8(e) Proposed Guidance in September of
1977, 1 ' and finalizing that guidance in its Section 8(e) Statement of In-
terpretation in March of 1978.' 5 This final Statement of Interpretation,
which will be discussed in some detail in the following pages, is of great
help in interpreting the statute but still leaves partially unanswered the
questions of interpretation noted above. These questions will now be con-
sidered in turn.
A. Who Is Subject to the Reporting Requirement
Section 8(e) specifically provides that "faJny person who manufac-
tures, processes, or distributes ... a chemical substance or mixture" is sub-
ject to the reporting requirement.' 6 EPA originally interpreted this lan-
guage to mean that any employee capable of recognizing substantial risks
Every manufacturer of motor vehicles or tires shall furnish notification of
any defect in any motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment. produced by such
manufacturer which he determines ... relates to motor vehicle safety, to the pur-
chaser ... within a reasonable time after such manufacturer has discovered such
defect.
' 4 42 Fed. Reg. 45,362 (1977) thereinafter cited as Section 8(e) Proposed Guidance],
15 43 Fed, Reg. 11,110 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Section 8(c) Statement of Inter-
pretation]. EPA reissued its guidance under the rubric "Statement of Interpretation and En-
forcement Policy . ' to avoid any suggestion that the guidelines were subject to the public com-
ment and delayed effectiveness provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §15
551-559 (1976). EPA never even considered issuing its notification guidelines as substantive
rather than interpretive rules, in contrast to the Consumer Product Safety Commission. See 43
Fed. Reg. 17,972, 17,973 (1977) (CPSC notice asking for comment on whether it should issue
its substantial product hazard guides as a substantive rather than an interpretive rule).
' 5 15 U.S.C. 2607(e) (1976).
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has the responsibility to report." Partly due to the extremely adverse
comment prompted by this proposal, EPA has softened this strict rule in its
final Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation." EPA now takes the position
that individual officers and employees can be relieved of their individual
duty to report to EPA if the employing organization establishes, internally
publicizes, and affirmatively implements procedures for employee submis-
sion and corporate processing of pertinent substantial risk data.' 9 Such
procedures must, at a minimum:
(I) Specify the information that officers and employees must
submit; (2) indicate how such submissions are to be prepared
and the company official to whom they are to be submitted; (3)
note the Federal penalties for failing to report; and (4) provide a
mechanism for promptly advising officers and employees in writ-
ing of the company's disposition of the report, including whether
or not the report was submitted to EPA (and if not, informing
employees of their right to report to EPA, as protected by
TSCA, section 23)."
Any employee of a company that has established and publicized the proce-
dures just described shall be considered to have discharged his obligation
under section 8(e) once he files his substantial risk report with the com-
pany. Nevertheless, all company officers who are responsible for imple-
menting such employee reporting procedures shall retain personal liability
for ensuring that any substantial risk information received from employees
is relayed to EPA.2 '
If a business organization does not establish the requisite employee
reporting procedures, EPA maintains that individual employees and offic-
ers must report substantial risk information directly to EPA itself." Al-
though the employee or officer may also report such information to his
superior rather than to EPA, such action will not satisfy his section 8(e) ob-
ligation. 23
EPA apparently feels that procedures which allow commercial estab-
lishments to assume exclusive responsibility for reporting will be in con-
formity with the agency's goal of ensuring that pertinent information ob-
tained by employees is promptly and appropriately considered, while
minimizing duplicative or ill-considered submissions. Such procedures also
appear to be in the best interest of any company affected by TSCA. Not
only will adoption of the suggested procedures lessen the friction between
employers and employees which could result from an employee directly
notifying EPA, but also the procedures assure that a company is fully aware
17
 Section 8(e) Proposed Guidance, 42 Fed. Reg. at 45,364.
"43 Fed. Reg. 11,110, 11,111 (1978).
"Id.
"Id. Section 23 of TSCA provides that no employer may discharge any employee or
discriminate against him with respect to the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because the employee commenced, caused to be commenced, or is
about to commence a proceeding under the Act. TSCA § 23(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a)(1)
(1976). If an employee notifies EPA under § 8(e) and feels that his employer has taken re-
taliatory action, EPA has taken the position that he can file a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor. Id. § 23(b)-(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)-(d).
27
 Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,111,
s2 Id,
s ' Id.
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of a possible substantial risk before an EPA investigation is underway.
However, it is still unclear whether there will be widespread adoption of
the procedures suggested by EPA.
While providing general guidelines, EPA has not attempted to detail
the specifics of an intracompany reporting procedure. Many companies
which manufacture consumer products, however, have already established
their own hazard documentation, evaluation and reporting procedures 24 in
response to their obligations under section 15 of the Consumer Product
Safety Act." Chemical manufacturers, distributors, and processors should
consider adopting similar procedures for evaluating and documenting po-
tential substantial risks under section 8(e). For example, a company should
draft guidelines classifying different types of hazards and outlining specific
steps which should be taken to evaluate each type of hazard. If there are
many different divisions within a company, procedures should be devel-
oped for distribution Of information to every division which could provide
valuable advice regarding the seriousness of the risk presented by a chemi-
cal or chemical mixture. The company should also consider delegating all
reporting responsibility to a special committee consisting of technical and
legal personnel, or alternatively, delegating that authority to one person
who can consult others as needed. 26 The chief executive officer of a
TSCA-regulated company should formally delegate the reporting responsi-
bility with a proviso that he be informed of all significant matters relating
to substantial risk. 27 In addition, each company should draft substantial risk
notification forms which are available to all employees. Procedures should
be developed so that these forms, containing all relevant information, are
immediately sent to the responsible committee or officer who has been del-
egated the reporting responsibility by the chief executive officer.
B. When Is Substantial Risk Information Obtained
The reporting requirement of section 8(e) arises when a person "ob-
tains information which reasonably supports [the existence of] a substantial
risk."28 Originally, EPA proposed that a person would be considered to
have "obtained" information within the meaning of section 8(e) as soon as
2.1 See WASHINGTON 131./ SiNESS INFORMATION, INC.. COMPLAINT, EVALUATION, DOGUMENTA•
TION AND CUR-ACTION PROCEDURES MR Dow CORNING CORPORATION (1975).
25 See text and note 12 sepia.
"Under the CPSC regulations, the chief executive officer must certify the authenticity
of information submitted 10 CPSC or delegate that authority. If the chief executive officer de-
cides to delegate the authority, he must submit a "Delegation of Authority" form to the CPSC.
16 C.F.R. § 1115,9 (1978).
" EPA has noted that even if a business organization establishes and publicizes the re-
quired procedures, the organization is still responsible for becoming cognizant of any substan-
tial risk information obtained by its officers or employees. Section 8(e) Statement of Interpre-
tation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,111.
Contractors anti independent laboratories are not responsible for reporting information
directly to EPA; rather, their client manufacturers, processors, and distributors have that re-
sponsibility. Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,114. EPA has also
apparently taken the position that submission of a § 8(e) notice by a trade association is inap-
propriate. See EPA, STiscrus REPORT, 8E-0178-0030 (March 17, 1978) (indicating that a notice
from the American Petroleum Institute on mutagenesis in crude shale oils may be inappropri-
ate).
25
 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1976).
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he received information suggesting substantial risk.29 However, since there is
nothing in either the language or the legislative history of the Act support-
ing a reporting requirement merely because a substantial risk is suggested,
EPA has revised its interpretation. 3° The Section 8(e) Statement of In-
terpretation now provides that a person "obtains" information within the
meaning of section 8(e) at the time he first comes into possession of or knows
of substantial risk information. 31
Section 8(e) is not intended to compel searches for information or re-
quire extraordinary efforts to acquire substantial risk data. However, if a
prudent person could reasonably be expected to be aware of the informa-
tion, EPA will consider that person to have "obtained" the information."
EPA maintains that negligent or intentional avoidance of information will
not absolve a person of his section 8(e) obligation. 33 Individual determina-
tions will necessarily have to be made in each case as to whether a person
actually "obtained" the information.
Although EPA has recently adopted a more lenient interpretation of
the term "obtains," the agency has maintained a stricter stance on the ac-
companying statutory phrase "reasonably supports ... a substantial risk." 34
EPA has emphasized in its interpretation of that phrase that the term "rea-
sonably supports" is not identical to a conclusive demonstration of substan-
tial risk." Rather, EPA has indicated that the former "typically occurs, and
must be reported at an earlier stage." 36 The question arises whether an in-
complete study with only preliminary results pointing to a substantial risk
"reasonably supports" the existence of a substantial risk within the meaning
of section 8(e). EPA answers this question affirmatively, in situations
"where appropriate," 37 but this answer does not really assist a company in
deciding whether to report. The final decision as to whether information
reasonably supports the existence of a substantial risk must be made by
technical personnel evaluating the. information in conjunction with legal
personnel who are familiar with section 8(e).
C. What Constitutes a Substantial Risk
In its Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, EPA attempts to give
some guidance concerning the definition of substantial risk:
A "substantial risk of injury to health or the environment"
is a risk of considerable concern because of (a) the seriousness of
" Section 8(e) Proposed Guidance, 42 Fed. Reg. at 45,364.
'° Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,111.
3 ' Id. Persons regulated under § 15 of CPSA, on the other hand, are required to report
as soon as they receive information which would lead a reasonable man to conclude that a
product defect could create a substantial product hazard. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1976). See note
12 supra for the text of § 15. Determining the scope of the term "could create" has led to
many problems for those in the consumer product distribution chain, and the deletion of the
"may suggest" language by EPA will hopefully avoid some of the same problems for industries
regulated under TSCA. See Kahan, The Reporting of Substantial Product Hazards Under Section 15
of The Consumer Product Act, 30 AD. L. REV, 289 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kahan].
" Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,114.
33 1d.
34 Id. at 11,110.
35
 Id.
"Id.
" Id. at 11,112.
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the effect ... and (b) the fact or probability of its occurrence,
(Economic or social benefits of use, or costs of restricting use, are
not to be considered in determining whether a risk is "substan-
tial".)38
Thus, in EPA's view, seriousness of effect and probability of occurrence are
the key factors in determining the existence of a substantial risk.
EPA has attempted to list the kinds of effects which are of sufficient
seriousness to constitute a substantial risk." The main problem with EPA's
list is the pervasive use of broad and vague terminology such as "relatively
serious impairment of normal activities," "strongly implicated," "serious or
prolonged incapacitation," "widespread and previously unsuspected distri-
bution," "pronounced bioaccumulation," "non-trivial adverse effect," and
"Id. at 11,111.
"Id, at 11,112. The factors listed were:
(a) Human health effects —(1) Any instance of cancer, birth defects,
mutagenicity, death, or serious or prolonged incapacitation, including the loss of'
or inability to use a normal bodily function with a consequent relatively serious
impairment of normal activities, if one (or a few) chemical(s) is strongly impli-
cated.
(2) Any pattern of effects or evidence which reasonably supports the con-
clusion that the chemical substance or mixture can produce cancer, mutation,
birth defects or toxic effects resulting in death, or serious or prolonged inca-
pacitation.
(b) Environmental effects
— (1) Widespread and previously unsuspected dis-
tribution in environmental media, as indicated in studies (excluding materials
contained within appropriate disposal facilities).
(2) Pronounced bioaccumulation. Measurements and indicators of pro-
nounced bioaccumulation heretofore unknown to the Administrator (including
bioaccumulation in fish beyond 5,000 times water concentration in a 30-day ex-
posure or having an n-octanol/water partition coefficient greater than 25,000)
should be reported when coupled with potential for widespread exposure and
any non-trivial adverse effect.
(3) Any non-trivial adverse effect, , heretofore unknown to the Adminis-
trator, associated with a chemical known w have bioaccumulated to a pronounced
degree or to be widespread in environmental media.
(4) Ecologically significant changes in species' interrelationships; that is,
changes in population behavior, growth, survival, etc. that in turn affect other
species' behavior, growth or survival.
Examples include: (i) Excessive stimulation of primary producers (algae,
macrophytes) in aquatic ecosystems, e.g., resulting in nutrient enrichment, or
eutrophication, of aquatic ecosystems.
(ii) Interference with critical biogeochemical cycles, such as the nitrogen
cycle.
(5) Facile transformation or degradation to a chemical having an unaccept-
able risk as defined above.
Id. The agency has taken the position that the listed human health effects will trigger the re-
porting requirement even if there is little exposure. Id. at 11,111. This position is grounded
on the presumption that the mere fact that the implicated chemical is in commerce constitutes
sufficient evidence of exposure. Id. Environmental effects, on the other hand, must involve or
be accompanied by the potential for significant levels of exposure because of general produc-
tion levels, persistence, typical uses, common means of disposal, or other factors. Id.
EPA also takes the view that emergency incidents of environmental contamination are
effects 'which must be reported. Id. 11,112. Any environmental contamination by a chemical
substance to which any of the above human or environmental effects have been ascribed must
be reported if, because of pattern, extent, or amount of contamination, the chemical (1) seri-
ously threatens humans with cancer, birth defects, mutation, death, or serious or prolonged
incapacitation, or (2) seriously threatens non-human organisms with large scale or ecologically
significant population destruction. Id.
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"ecologically significant changes in species' interrelationships." Unfortu-
nately, what is ecologically significant or non-trivial to one scientist is not so
to another. Thus, while EPA has made a fairly good attempt to develop ob-
jective criteria for a decision that must necessarily relate to the facts of each
individual case, these criteria should provide only a starting point. The
party responsible for reporting at each company also should consult with
company legal personnel who should be able to give some advice as to
whether the risk is reportable under EPA criteria and under the case law
that may have developed up to that point.
If technical people believe that a chemical creates a substantial risk to
human health or the environment based on the EPA criteria, management
should evaluate the problem very carefully before determining not to make
a section 8(e) report. Unlike the reporting of potential substantial product
hazards under CPSA," reporting under section 8(e) is essentially a scien-
tific and technical decision where the views of toxicologists and scientists
must be given the utmost consideration. When EPA investigates to deter-
mine whether a report should have been made earlier, any documents or
testimony revealing internal company scientific opinion of the existence of
a substantial risk could be used to support a civil penalty. This does not
mean that management must make a section 8(e) report whenever one sci-
entist says a report should be made. If that opinion is based upon ques-
tionable data, a second opinion may be sought from another source without
violating either the letter or spirit of section 8(e). For example, a single oc-
currence of cancer or other serious effect should probably not be reported
unless there is other evidence strongly implicating the chemical. 4 '
Nevertheless, where there appears to be a valid basis for opinion that a
substantial risk exists, the safest course to follow is to immediately file a re-
port with EPA while still continuing testing to verify the original opinion.
As noted earlier, a company does not necessarily have to have conclusive
information of risk before reporting. 42
D. Information Which Reasonably Supports the Existence of a Substantial Risk
EPA has stated that there are two primary sources of information
which "often 'reasonably support' the existence of substantial risk": (1) De-
signed and controlled studies including in vivo experiments and tests, in
vitro experiments and tests, epidemiological studies, and environmental
monitoring studies; and (2) Undesigned and uncontrolled studies. 43 This
40 See note 12 supra.
4 ' Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,114.
" See text at notes 34-36 supra. In its original proposed guidance, EPA took the posi-
tion that human health effects and environmental effects need not be conclusively demon-
strated to be caused by a chemical substance or mixture as long as evidence links the chemical
substance 'or mixture to the effects. Section 8(e) Proposed Guidance, 42 Fed. Reg. at 45,365.
This provision was dropped because of the vagueness of the term "links." Section 8(e) State-
ment of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,112. Again, the safest course for a company to fol-
low is to consult with as many experts as it can to determine if the suspected effects result
from the suspect chemical. 11 there is some opinion that there is a cause and effect relation-
ship, and that opinion appears based on valid, albeit controvertible, data, the company proba-
bly should report.
43
 Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,112.
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latter category includes medical and health surveys, clinical studies, and re-
ports concerning effects on consumers, workers, or the environment. 44 A
company is not required under section 8(e) to conduct studies to determine
whether a chemical presents a substantial risk, but should it become aware
of studies pointing to such a risk, that study should be carefully evalu-
ated. 45 In general, any source of information could point to a substantial
risk although the basis for most reports will probably be controlled or un-
controlled studies and employee exposure data.
Even if certain information reasonably supports the existence of sub-
stantial risk, it need not be reported to EPA if it has been: (1) published by
EPA in a report; (2) suhimtted in writing to EPA pursuant to any manda-
tory reporting requirement under TSCA at-some other law administered by
EPA as long as that report contains all the information that EPA requires
in a section 8(e) report and is identified from that point on as a section 8(e)
notice; or (3) published in the scientific literature and referenced by one of
six abstract services:"
E. Information Received Prior to the Effective Date of the Act
EPA has taken the position that any substantial risk information pos-
sessed by a person prior to January 1, 1977, the effective date of TSCA,
must be reported to EPA by May 16, 1978 if the person was aware of the
information after January 1, 1977. 47 EPA considers a person aware of in-
formation after January 1, 1977 if he reviewed memoranda, written re-
ports, and other documents after that date or participated in conferences
or discussions after January 1, 1977 which referred to the information. 48
Additionally, a person will be considered aware of information if he has
been "alerted" to it after January 1, 1977, including any information con-
cerning a chemical for which the person is presently assessing health and
environmental effects." Finally, in a catchall paragraph, EPA has stated
"Id. Any information received through product liability suits or customer complaints
can also point to a substantial risk. Id. Consumer complaints should be kept and evaluated; it is
possible that consumer complaints could be sufficient to trigger the reporting requirement if
'there are numerous complaints of serious effects even if no specific study points to substantial
risk. For example, on November 7, 1977, Velsicol Chemical Corporation filed a § 8(e) notice
concerning the allergenic effect of DCPD acrylate on one employee. Section 8(e) Notice 8E-
1177-0017P. Since the employee had worked with numerous other chemicals and there was
only a minor health effect identified, EPA concluded no action should be taken. This is just an
example of how cautious, and possibly overcautious, some companies are being in reporting
under § 8(e).
46 EPA can require a company to test a specific chemical or mixture under certain cir-
cumstances. TSCA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976). - See note 7 supra.
"Section 8(e) Statement of interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,112. The six abstract ser-
vices are (1) Agricola, (2) Biological Abstracts, (3) Chemical Abstracts, (4) Dissertation
Abstracts, (5) Index Medicus, and (6) National Technical Information Service. Id.
Information also need not he reported if it is simply corroborative of well-established
adverse effects already documented in the scientific literature and referenced in one of the six
services listed above, unless the information concerns an emergency incident of environmental
contamination, Id. If the information is contained in a notification of spills under 311(b)(5)
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(5) (Supp. 1978), it also
need not be reported. Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,1 12.
47
 Section 8(e) Statement of InterpretatiOn, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,112.
49 1d.
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that a person will be considered aware of information of which he has
actual knowledge.'"
There is nothing in either the legislative history or the specific lan-
guage of section 8(e) requiring that information received prior to the effec-
tive date of TSCA be reported. Indeed, many commenters on EPA's Sec-
tion 8(e) Proposed Guidance argued that section 8(e) applies only to infor-
mation obtained after January 1, 1977.5 ' Notwithstanding the lack of sup-
port in the legislative history for the retroactive application of section 8(e),
EPA would likely prevail in a court test on this issue. The courts have had
no problem applying the defect notification provisions of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 196652 to automobiles manufac-
tured prior to the effective date of that law." Similarly, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission has taken the position that anyone obtaining
information that a product defect could create a substantial product hazard
must report regardless of when that information was obtained." One
commentator has examined the constitutional aspects of the CPSC position
and concluded that neither the prohibition against ex post facto legislation
nor the due process requirements of the fifth amendment would forbid
such an interpretation of,CPSA. 55
As under CPSA, any constitutional-challenge to the retroactive appli-
cation of section 8(e) would in all likelihood fail. The question thus be-
comes one of statutory construction: Did Congress intend section 8(e) to be
applied retroactively? In light of the broad purpose of TSCA to prevent
unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment," it is unlikely
that a court would limit substantial risk reporting only to information "ob-
tained" after the effective date of the Act. Section 8(e) was passed to pre-
vent risks such as those associated with the Kepone disaster in Virginia; 57 a
court is not likely to hold that a person has no obligation to report such a
risk simply because he obtained information relating to the danger before
January 1, 1977.
Thus, under section 8(e) a person must report if he was aware of the
danger after January 1, 1977 even if he obtained the information prior to
that date. As noted above,58 EPA has taken a rather broad view as to the
meaning of the term "aware." However, if a company scientist or officer
has read about a substantial risk associated with a chemical but only has a
5 ° Id. at 11,112-13.
" Id. at 11,1101 1.
52 15 U.S.C.	 1411 (1976).
52 See, e.g., United States v.' General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 425-27 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (applying notification provisions to wheels on 1960.65 pickup trucks); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 65 F.R.D. 115, 116, 120 (D.D.C. 1974) (applying notification provisions
to pitman arm failures on 1959-60 model year Cadillacs), rev'd,on other grounds, 561 F.2d 923
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 765 (1977),
" Although the applicable regulation, 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1977), does not state
explicitly that information received prior to the effective date of the law must be reported,
CPSC maintains that information must be reported regardless of when it is received.
55
 Note, Federal Regulation of "Substantial Product Hazards": An Analysis of Section 15 of the
Consumer Product Safety Act, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 717, 720-30 (1976).
" S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2c1 Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in LEcistArivE HISTORY, supra
note 3, at 157.
57 5. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
Supra note 3, at 178.
"See text at note 50 supra.
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vague recollection of the specifics, that person is not obligated to go back
through the records and search out the information; he is not "aware" of
the information." On the other hand, if that person has seen a report or
discussed substantial risk information with others so that the information is
fairly clear in his mind after January 1, 1977, he should report that infor-
mation even if he read the report or had the discussion prior to January 1,
1977. 8 "
11. MECHANICS OF REPORTING UNDER SECTION 8(e)
Once a business organization, through either its section 8(e) review
committee or through the person delegated section 8(e) responsibility by
the chief executive officer, determines that it is in the possession of sub-
stantial risk information, it must then decide whether to report. The or-
ganization could decide, of course, that it would rather risk the penalties
for not reporting" rather than take the consequences that can result from
a report. Such consequences could be adverse publicity," a possible EPA
ordered halt in manufacture or recall under section 6 or 7, 83 and possible
product liability suits." However, if an organization does decide to report,
it should be aware of the procedures involved.
Section 8(e) requires any person who obtains substantial risk informa-
tion to "immediately inform" EPA of such information." EPA has inter-
preted the term "immediately inform" to mean that EPA must receive a
section 8(e) report not later than the 15th working day after the date the
person obtained such information." Written notices are directed to be de-
livered to the EPA Office of Toxic Substances and should:
(a) Be sent by certified mail .. ,
(b) State that it is being submitted in accordance with section
8(e),
(c) Contain the job title, name, address, telephone number, and
signature of the person reporting and the name and address of
the manufacturing, processing, or distributing establishment with
which he is associated,
(d) Identify the chemical substance or mixture (including, if
known, the CAS Registry Number),
(e) Summarize the adverse effects being reported, describing the
nature and the extent of the risk involved, and
(f) Contain the specific source of the information together with a
summary and the source of any available supporting technical
data.° 7
"See Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,114.
"See id.
" See text and notes 69-71 infra.
82
 See text at notes 109-24 infra.
" See text at not 77-84 infra.
"See text at notes 103-108 infra.
66
 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1976).
" Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,113. Supplementary in-
formation generated after a 8(e) notification must also be immediately reported, if appropri-
ate. Id. For emergency incidents of environmental contamination, a person must report the in-
cident to EPA by telephone as soon as he has knowledge of the information. Id.
" Id.
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Many companies that have reported under section 8(e) to date have at-
tached copies of studies which the companies nevertheless assert may not
constitute section 8(e) data." Even if a company is not absolutely convinced
that the data rises to the level of substantial risk information, however, it is
still prudent to report the information with the disclaimer that the notice is
not an admission that the data or studies demonstrate substantial risk.
It is important that all persons with any responsibility under section
8(e) be as completely informed as possible since noncompliance can result
in a civil penalty of $25,000. 69 Each day which passes without reporting
constitutes a separate violation and subjects the violator to another $25,000
penalty." Violation of section 8(e) could also give rise to criminal penalties
in those cases involving a'knowing or willful failure to notify EPA of a sub-
stantial risk. 7 '
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF REPORTING UNDER SECTION 8(e)
There are five primary consequences of reporting under section 8(e)
that should be of concern to every reporting business organization. First,
EPA could use the section 8(e) information to institute imminent hazard
proceedings under section 7 of Act," or to seek a rule under section 6 of
the Act." A section 6 rule could require, inter alia: the cessation of man-
ufacturing, processing, or distribution; the limitation of the amount of the
chemical which may be manufactured, processed, or distributed in com-
merce; notice of an unreasonable risk of injury; or, the replacement or re-
purchase of the substance as elected by the person to which the require-
ment is directed." Second, EPA could determine that the reporter has not
filed its notice in a timely fashion under section 8(e) and could seek penal-
" The author obtained numerous § 8(e) notices from EPA pursuant to a Freedom of
Information Act request. Velsicol Chemical Corporation, which has submitted numerous
notices, uniformly stated that the company makes no judgment that studies submitted contain
substantial risk information. See, for example, Velsicol Section 8(e) Notices: SEHQ-0578-0142
(May 1, 1978); 8EHQ-0178-0031PS (January 13, 1978); 8EHQ-1177.0018PS (November 7,
1977); 8EHQ-1077-0007 (September 26, 1977); 8EHQ-1077-0008 (September 26, 1977);
8EHQ-0977-0005 (September 7, 1977); 8F.HQ-0777-0001 (July 21, 1977).
" TSCA §§ 15, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2614, 2615 (1976). Under § 15(3), it is a violation of
the Act to fail to give the requisite notice under § 8(e). 15 U.S.C. § 2614(3) (1976). An alleged
violator has the right to a full adjudicatory hearing pursuant to the provisions of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976), before the Administrator can assess the civil
penalty. TSCA § 16(a)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A) (1976). On August 4, 1978, EPA pub-
lished interim rules of practice setting forth the procedures to be followed by parties litigating
administratively assessed penalties under § 16 of the TSCA. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,729 (1978).
7°
 TSCA § 16(a)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1976).
Id. § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b). Section 16(b) provides:
Any person who knowingly or willfully violates any provision of section (151 of
this title shall, in addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty which may be imposed
under subsection (a) of this section for such violation, be subject, upon convic-
tion, to a fine of not more than $25,000 for each day of violation, or to impris-
onment for not more than one year, or both.
In addition, EPA can seek to enjoin a violation of § 8(e) under § 17, which provides that the
district courts shall have jurisdiction over civil actions to restrain any violation of § 15 (failure
to notify under § 8(e) is a violation of § 15) and to compel the taking of action required by
TSCA. Id. § 17(a)(1)(A), (C), 15 U.S.C. § 2616(a)(1)(A), (C).
71 See note 8 supra.
' 3 Id.
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ties for noncompliance pursuant to section 15 and 16 of TSCA. 75 Third,
EPA could issue an order requiring the testing of the chemical substance
pursuant to section 4 of the Act.'" Fourth, potential plaintiffs could use the
section 8(e) information, and the fact that a notice was filed against a com-
pany in a product liability suit. Finally, adverse publicity and the possible
public release of confidential and sensitive information could result from a
report. These potential consequences will now be considered in turn.
A. Proceedings Under Sections 6 and 7
Section 6 of TSCA provides that the EPA Administrator can,
by rule, take rather drastic action against a chemical that presents
or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.
EPA can order, among other things, a halt to manufacturing and distribu-
tion, and replacement or repurchase." In order for EPA to seek a section
6 rule there must be evidence that the suspect chemical or mixture presents
an "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment ...." 7" By
comparison, a section 8(e) report, although it relates only to "substantial
risk" rather than to "unreasonable risk," may well provide just the informa-
tion which EPA needs to institute a section 6 rulemaking proceeding.'" Un-
reasonable risk is nowhere defined in TSCA, but since it involves elements
of "probability of harm, the potential severity of that harm, and similar
considerations," the elements of unreasonable risk and substantial risk are
very similar." If a company reports substantial risk information under sec-
tion 8(e), it is also providing exactly the kind of information which EPA
needs to justify the initiation of a section 6 rulemaking.
Upon receipt of a section 8(e) notification, EPA will evaluate the risk
and thereafter draft a complete status report on the suspect chemical. That
report will describe the contents of the notice, and the current use of the
suspect chemical. It will also include a toxicological evaluation and a rec-
ommendation as to what action should be taken in connection with the
chemical. There are numerous options open to the agency in deciding what
action to take. It could recommend that no action be taken due to the low
75 See text at notes 69-71 supra.
"See note 7 supra.
77
 TSCA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1976); see note 8 supra.
"I'SCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1976).
7" A § 6 rulemaking proceeding is conducted in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). In addition, EPA must;
(A) publish a notice of proposed rulemaking stating with particularity the reason
for the proposed rule; (B) allow interested persons to submit written data, views,
and arguments, ...; (C) provide an opportunity for an informal hearing in ac-
cordance with [§ 6(c)(3)1; (D) promulgate, if appropriate, a final rule based on
the matter in the rulemaking record ... ; and (E) make and publish with the rule
the finding described in l§ 6(a)].
TSCA § 6(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(2) (1976). Section 6(a) empowers the EPA Administrator
to act upon a finding that there is "a reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture, pro-
cessing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture, or that
any combination of such activities, presents or will present an unreasonable risk or injury to
the health or the environment ...."Id. § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1976).
"Compare Gaynor, The Toxic Substances Control Act, 30 VAND. L. Rev. 1149, 1153 (1977)
(definition of "unreasonable risk") with Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation, 43 Fed. Reg.
at 11,111 (defining "substantial risk").
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production volume of the chemical." EPA could also recommend referral
to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and
to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) if the chem-
ical is basically an occupational hazard." However, should EPA conclude
that the section 8(e) data demonstrates that the product presents an unrea-
sonable risk, a section 6 proceeding could be recommended."
Of course, the possibility of a section 6 proceeding is not a valid rea-
son not to report if a company concludes it has section 8(e) information. If
the chemical actually presents either a substantial or an unreasonable risk,
EPA may well learn of the risk through published studies or some other
source." When EPA does become aware of the risk, it is quite possible that
those manufacturing, processing or distributing the chemical could be sub-
ject to penalties for failure to report if EPA concludes that the company
concealed substantial risk information."
Section 7 of TSCA authorizes EPA to control "imminent hazards.""
An imminent hazard is defined as one which is likely to result in serious or
widespread injury to health or the environment before a final rule protect-
ing against unreasonable risk can be promulgated under section 6." A sec-
tion 8(e) report could very well lead EPA to conclude that the chemical
presents an imminent-hazard within the purview of section 7. If so, EPA
could seek a court order for seizure of the chemical or other relief to pro-
tect health and the environment." However, just as with section 6, if the
chemical does in fact present an imminent hazard, EPA will likely learn of
it sooner or later. Accordingly, the safest course for a company to follow is
to report the risk. In addition, the company might consider taking some
voluntary recall action, in order to lessen its product liability exposure by
minimizing the chance of further injury or environmental harm.
B. Civil Penalties
It is too early in the development of the EPA's section 8(e) procedures
to judge whether the agency will examine the timeliness of section 8(e) re-
ports. At this time, EPA is primarily concerned with the completion of the
St
 Under § 8(a), EPA can require companies to submit the total amount of each sub-
stance and mixture manufactured as well as "reasonable estimates of the total amount to be
manufactured or processed, the amount manufactured or processed for each of its categories
of use, and reasonable estimates of the amount to be manufactured dr processed for each of
its categories of use or proposed categories of use." 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(2)(C) (1976). For ex-
amples of an EPA recommendation that no action be taken due to low production volume, see
EPA, STATUS REPORT 8E-0278-0042 (March 17, 1978), and EPA, STATus REPORT 8E-0777-0001(August 10, 1977).
" See, e.g., EPA, STATus REPORT 8E-378-0086 (March 28, 1978); EPA, STATUS REPORT
8E-0278-0052P (March 17, 1978); EPA, STATUS REPORT 8E-0278-0044 (March 17, 1978).
See text and notes 79-80 supra.
" The TSCA Interagency Testing Committee has been given the task of identifying
and recommending to the Administrator chemical substances which should be tested to de-
termine their hazard to human health or to the environment. TSCA § 4(e), 15 U.S.C. §
2603(e) (1976). This committee will inform EPA of those chemicals which are already in the
suspect category. For examples of Interagency Testing Committee reports, see 42 Fed. Reg.
55,025-26 (1977); 49 Fed. Reg. 16,683-88 (1978),
"See text and notes 69-71 supra.
SS
 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1976). See note 8 supra.
" TSCA § 7(f), 15 U.S.C. § 2606(1) (1976).
" Id. 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a).
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chemical inventory and getting TSCA enforcement underway. The agency
is therefore not likely to immediately divert personnel to examine the time-
liness of section 8(e) reports. However, if the Consumer Product Safety
Commission experience with the defect notification provisions of CPSA is
any example, EPA at some point will develop an enforcement policy re-
garding the timeliness of section 8(e) reports. Until . that policy is developed,
however, companies should be aware that a section 8(e) report can trigger
an investigation into whether the company has obtained substantial risk in-
formation and illegally delayed its reporting.
A section 8(e) timeliness investigation would be much more likely in a
Kepone-type situation where a section 8(e) report could be a significant fac-
tor in EPA taking action to avoid danger to health and the environment. if
EPA should become aware that the company knew of the serious risk pre-
sented by a chemical and did not "immediately" report the substantial risk,
the agency would much more likely seek penalties for late reporting. As
noted previously, sections 15 and 16 of TSCA provide that any failure or
delay in reporting can result in a fine of up to $25,000. EPA could seek
$25,000 a day in penalties since each day which passes without reporting
consititu'tes a separate violation."
Developments in the CPSC area are helpful in judging just what could
happen in section 8(e) timeliness cases. CPSC has brought several actions
against consumer product manufacturers for failure to immediately notify
the Commission of a defect that could create a substantial product
hazard." The cases have resulted in settlements in the amount of $325,000
(out of a possible $500,000 maximum)," $40,000, 92 and $25,000. 93 No
company to date has fought a. Commission complaint which alleged that the
company failed to file a substantial product hazard report under section 15
of CPSA. The CPSC has used the timeliness weapon very sparingly and it is
quite possible that EPA will do the same.
Nonetheless, a TSCA-regulated company should not risk continuing
daily fines of up to $25,000 without careful consideration. If the company
has obtained substantial risk information, it has 15 days to report to EPA 94
and every day of delay, as noted, can be costly. All a company can do is use
its best judgment in determining whether it has "obtained" section 8(e) in-
formation, basing that judgment upon expert technical and legal advice. If
the company concludes that the information could well be section 8(e) in-
formation, it may be safer to report and take the consequences rather than
risk a $25,000 continuing daily fine. Experience seems to indicate that
many companies are taking this position since as of June 6, 1978, there
have been over 200 substantial risk notices to EPA."
" See text and notes 69-71 supra.
"For a more in-depth discussion of these cases see Kahan, supra note 31.
91 In re Corning Glass Works, CPSC Docket No. 77-4 (July 14, 1977).
51 In re Wham-0 Mfg., CPSC Docket No. 77-2 (Oct. 27, 1977).
" In re North Am. Systems, CPSC Docket No. 77-3 (June 16, 1977).
' Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretatibn, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,113.
1' 4 As noted previously, many companies simply report under § 8(e), adding a disclaimer
that the report does not constitute an admission that the chemical presents a substantial risk.
See note 68 supra. Velsicol has included a sentence in its notices reserving the right to contest
the propriety of Section 8(e) of TSCA. Id. Others have noted that the report does not consti-
tute a waiver of legal privilege against self-incrimination or right of immunity. Section 8(e)
Notice SEHQ-0877-0002 (July 28, 1977) (Mobil Oil Corporation report on Mobilsol 44, a
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C. Testing Order Under Section 4
Under section 4 of TSCA, the EPA Administrator must require the
testing of a chemical if he finds that the chemical may present an unrea-
sonable risk of injury to health or to the environment, that there is insuffi-
cient information to assess the effects of use of the chemical, and that test-
ing is required to develop such data." The testing requirement must he
promulgated by rule," with the additional right to oral presentations. 98 If
EPA issues such a rule, the manufacturer or processor is required to per-
form the required testing. EPA must take into account the costs of the tests
required and the availability of test facilities to perform the tests."
It is quite possible that a section 8(e) report could trigger a section 4
rulemaking proceeding. One recent section 8(e) notice by Velsicol Chemical
Company prompted EPA to consider a section 4 order)" On December
16, 1977, Velsicol submitted information concerning occupational health
problems related to the chemicals methendic anhydride and maleic
anhydride. Upon review of information that the chemicals could cause irrita-
tion to eyes and the respiratory tract, the OTS staff recommended that
consideration be given to initiation of a synergistic effects study, possibly
under section 4. 1 "
Again, it is too early in the development of agency TSCA procedures
to determine to what extent section 8(e) reports will result in section 4 or-
ders. However, since "substantial risk" and "unreasonable risk" are very
similar standards, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that section 8(e)
reports could result in EPA requiring testing of the suspect chemical. EPA
could order massive testing of carcinogenesis, mutagenesis, teratogenesis,
behavioral disorders, and cumulative and synergistic effects)" Thus, al-
though, the cost of testing is a factor to be considered by the agency in de-
termining whether to require it, section 4 testing could nevertheless be very
costly to a TSCA-regulated business.
D. Product Liability Consequences
A person suffering injury from the chemical could attempt to use a
section 8(e) notice as an admission by the reporting company that its chem-
ical is defective and unreasonably dangerous thus subjecting the company
flexibiliter diluent). Whichever tack a company takes, it is probably safer to report clisclaiMing
liability and asserting that the chemical does not present a substantial risk than to risk penal-
ties for not reporting.
" TSCA § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1976). See note 7 supra.
" TSCA § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1976).
"Id. § 4(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(6)(5).
" Id. § 4(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(1).
1 " EPA, STATUS REPORT 8EHQ-0278-0063 (May 12, 1978).
101 Id.
102 TSCA § 4(b)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(6)(2)(A) (1976). It should be noted that in cases
of occupational hazards, companies can request a health hazard evaluation by NIOSH. Section
20(a)(6) of OSHA, provides that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare shall deter-
mine, following a written request by an employer or authorized representative of employees,
whether any substance normally found in the workplace has potentially toxic effects. 29 U.S.C.
§ 669(a)(6) (1976). If the substance does have such an effect, the information must be submit-
ted immediately to the Secretary of Labor for possible promulgation of a health or safety
standard. Id.
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to strict liability exposure" or suit under traditional negligence or war-
ranty principles.' 04
 The plaintiff in such a product liability suit will almost
certainly have a difficult time proving causation. 105 It is possible in certain
cases, however, such as those involving generally recognized carcinogens or
disease causing chemicals, that a plaintiff will be able to present sufficient
evidence of causation. For example, in Industrial Indemnity Exchange v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission,'"' the court held that evidence of mere exposure
to silicon dust was sufficient to support a finding that plaintiff's fatal pul-
monary tuberculosis silicosis was job-related.'" In such cases, plaintiffs
could attempt to introduce a section 8(e) notice to show that a defendant_
chemical company recognized the dangerous nature of its product and in-
deed had evidence to detnonstrate the danger.
It is possible that a court would admit a section 8(e) notice into evi-
dence in a product liability suit concerning a toxic substance. In this re-
gard, a section 8(e) notice can be analogized to automobile recall notices
which inform car owners of a safety hazard associated with their au-
tomobile. A number of courts have admitted automobile recall notices into
evidence in product liability cases even though in the past such evidence
has been excluded under the hearsay rule, rules of relevancy, and the rule
against introduction of subsequent remedial measures. 1 U 8
1 " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A states the generally
accepted principles or saict liability:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if'
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
'04 The product liability consequences of reporting under § 8(e) are in sonic ways simi-
lar to the product liability consequences of reporting under § 15 of CPSA. See generally Kahan,
supra note 31.
1 " See, e.g., Miller v. National Cabinet Coin 8 N.Y.2d 277, 288, 168 N.E.2d ill, 817,
204 N.Y.S.2d 129, 137 (1960) (causation not established in showing relationship between ben-
zene exposure and leukemia); Clark v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 155 W.Va.
726, 732, 187 S.E.2d 213, 217 (1972) (no proof of cause and effect. between multiple chemical
exposure and leukemia). But see McCallister v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 69 Cal.
2d 408, 416-17, 71 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 445 P.2d 313, 317 (1968) (smoke inhaled by fireman
was carcinogenic and it was "reasonably probable" that job-related smoke inhalation caused
lung cancer and death of fireman),
" 6 87 Cal. App. 465, 197 P.2d 75 (1948),
"'Id. at 468, 197 P.2d at 77. See also Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
29 Cal. 2d 79, 81-82, 172 P.2d 884, 886 (1946) (exposure to silicon caused fatal silicosis); Heck
v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa, 140, 143, 226 A.2d 87, 89-90 (1967) (defendant corporation can
be liable for damages to plaintiff who resided near defendant's beryllium manufacturing facil-
ity if plaintiff can show the beryllium emission level caused her disease and defendant should
have had reason to believe that its emissions could be harmful).
' 1" See Farrier v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 526-28 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Farmers
Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793-95 (8th Cir. 1977); Shaffer v. Honeywell, 249
N.W.2d 251, '257 n.7.(S.D. 1976). Contra, Vockie v. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 66
F.R.D. 57, 61 (E.D. Pa.), affd without published opinion, 523 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1975); Landry v.
Adams, 282 So. 2d 590, 596 (La. App. 1973). For a detailed discussion of these cases see Ka-
han, supra note 31, at 306-09. 875
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E. Adverse Publicity and Protection of Confidential and Sensitive Information
A section 8(e) report could result in adverse publicity if the informa-
tion contained in the notice was made public. It is therefore important to
examine exactly what section 8(e) information will be protected from dis-
closure by EPA. EPA has indicated in its Section 8(e) Statement of Interpre-
tation that any person submitting a notice to EPA under section 8(e) may as-
sert "a business confidentiality claim covering all or part of the information
contained in the notice."'" Any information subject to a claim of confiden-
tiality will be disclosed only to the extent and by means of the procedures
set forth by the Act and the EPA regulations.'"
It is unlikely that a• company would be able to keep the mere fact of
its filing a section 8(e) notice and the contents of such a notice confidential.
Under the Freedom of Information Act," the public has access to all gov-
ernment records unless the requested . information falls within one of the
specific exemptions set forth in the Act.'" The exemption that most com-
panies would invoke to prevent the release of the name of the company
reporting under section 8(e), as well as the chemical reported, is the fourth
exemption." 3 This exemption states that "trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confiden-
tial" are exempt from disclosure." 4
The key question, then, is whether the name of a reporting company
and the reported chemical could be considered confidential. The leading
case on the fourth exemption states that in order to determine whether in-
formation is confidential within the meaning of the exemption, a court
must focus on three factors: (I) whether the information would customarily
be disclosed to the public by the person from whom it was obtained; (2)
whether release would impair the government's ability to obtain necessary
information in the future; and (3) whether release would cause substantial
harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information
was obtained." 5
 Considering the last of these factors, it would be very dif-
ficult for any business to demonstrate that release of the mere fact that it
has filed a section 8(e) notice in connection with a certain chemical would
cause ,substantial harm to its competitive position. Moreover, reference to
the legislative history of the fourth exemption indicates that is was designed
to protect against the release of business sales statistics, inventories, cus-
tomer lists, scientific or manufacturing processes or developments, not the
fact that a company has filed a notice with the government.'"
'" 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,113.
•	 "° Id.
"' 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
"' Id. § 552(b).
" 3 Id. 552(b)(4).
"'Id. For judicial interpretations of this exemption see National Parks and Conserva-
tion Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450
F.2d 698, 708-09 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"1
 National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767-71 (D.C. Cir.
1974). The National Parks and Conservation Ass'n criteria for determining whether information
is confidential within the meaning of the fourth exemption have been adopted by EPA. 40
C.F.R. § 2.208 (1978).
"° See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1964). See also Note, Public Disclosure of Confidential Business Information Under the
Freedom of Information Act: Toward a More Objective Standard, 60 CORNELL REV. 109 (1974). It
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Although a company is unlikely to succeed in any attempt to keep the
fact that it has filed a section 8(e) notice and the nature of the reported
chemical confidential, this does not mean that a company will be unable to
protect any of the information contained in a section 8(e) notice. Section 14
of TSCA"/ provides that confidential information and trade secret data,
exempt from disclosure under the fourth exemption of FOIA, shall not be
disclosed under TSCA. Therefore, any information satisfying the stric-
tures of the fourth exemption Will remain confidential. There are three
limited exceptions to this rule" 9 and one rather broad exception which al-
lows the Administrator to disclose all confidential information if it is
"necessary to protect against unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment."" 9 However,• it should be the rare case where the Adminis-
trator should find it necessary to disclose confidential information to pro-
tect health and the environment. In those instances where EPA does de-
termine that disclosure is necessary to protect health or the environment,
the Administrator must give the affected business at least 24 hours notice
so that it can seek judicial relief.' 29 In all other cases where disclosure is
permitted under another exception to the general rule of nondisclosure,
the Administrator must give businesses 15 days notice before releasing data
which is subject to a claim of confidentiality.'"
Generally, trade secret information such as manufacturing processes
and formulae contained in a section 8(e) notice will be protected from dis-
closure. Companies should realize, however, that health and safety data will
not receive the same protection. Under section 14, health and safety data
will be disclosed with respect to any chemical substance or mixture which,
on the date the study is to be disclosed, has been offered for commercial
distribution, is subject to a section 4 testing order, or is subject to a notifica-
tion order under section 5.122
should be noted that EPA did delete the name of the reporting company in some of the
notices provided the author under FO1A. See, e.g., Section 8(e) Notice 8EHQ-0278.00575
(Nov. 30, 1977). It is questionable whether such a deletion would be upheld if challenged in
court.
" 7
 TSCA § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (1976).
""Id. § 14(a)(1),(2),(4), 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(1),(2),(4). Confidential information can be
disclosed to any officer or employee of the United States for the protection of health or the
environment or for specific law enforcement purposes. It can also be disclosed to contractors
of the United States if' such disclosure is necessary for the satisfactory performance of a con-
tract with the government entered into on or after October 11, 1976. Finally, the Adminis-
trator can disclose information when relevant in any TSCA proceeding, but such disclosure
must be made in such manner as to preserve confidentiality to the extent practicable without
impairing the proceedi ng. Id.
'"Id. § 14(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(3).
10 1d. § 14(c)(2)(13)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(2)(13)(i).
121 Id. EPA has been sensitive to the assertion of TSCA regulatedcompanies that the
unauthorized release of confidential data provided to EPA could be of great competitive harm
to the company which provided the information. Accordingly, EPA formed a TSCA Data Se-
curity Task Force, 42 Fed. Reg. 57,984 (1977), which recommended elaborate security proce-
dures for maintaining the confidentiality of such information. 43 Fed. Reg. 1,836 (1978). The
final draft of the TSCA security manual is now available to the public. 43 Fed. Reg. 32,186
(1978). Whether the procedures finally adopted, such as encryption of information, will suc-
cessfully protect sensitive TSCA data remains to be seen.
" 2 TSCA § 14(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(l)(A) (1976). This section specifically states
that it should not be construed as authorizing release of manufacturing processes or disclosing
the portion of the mixture comprised by any of the chemical substances in the mixture.
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In sum, the general information contained in section 8(e) notices will
be available for public inspection notwithstanding a request that such in-
formation be kept confidential.' 23
 TSCA-regulated companies must be pre-
pared to meet any adverse publicity resulting from a section 8(e) report.' 24
Such adverse publicity may not be as serious as that resulting from a notice
in the consumer product area since purchasers of chemicals and toxic sub-
stances are much more sophisticated than the average consumer and tend
to accept more readily the fact that there may be adverse effects resulting
from the use of toxic substances. But the marketability of a chemical that is
the subject of a section 8(e) notice can be affected and companies should be
prepared to explain to their customers the basis for filing the report.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clearly not a simple task to determine whether one is in posses-
sion of information that must be reported under section 8(e). However, by
instituting proper evaluation procedures with input from legal and technical
personnel, most companies should be able to fulfill their section 8(e) re-
sponsibilities. Detailed knowledge of the Section 8(e) Statement of Interpre-
tation by management, coupled with an up-to-date familiarity with EPA's
handling and evaluation of section 8(e) reports should go a long way to-
wards assuring that a company fully complies with the dictates of section
8(e).
12  The procedures for claiming confidentiality for information in a § 8(e) notice are as
follows:
(b) If no claim accompanies the notice at the time it is submitted to EPA,
the notice will be placed in an open file to be available to the public without
further notice to the submitter.
(c) To assert a claim of confidentiality for information contained in a
notice, the submitter must submit two copies of the notice.
(1) One copy must be complete. In that copy the submitter must indicate
what information, if any, is claimed as confidential by marking the specified in-
formation on each page with a label such as "confidential," "proprietary," or
"trade secret."
(2) If some information in the notice is claimed as confidential, the submit-
ter must submit a second copy. The second copy must be complete except that all
information claimed as confidential in the first copy must be deleted.
(3) The first copy of the notice will be disclosed by EPA only to the extent,
and by means of the procedures, set forth in 40 CFR Part 2. The second copy
will be placed in an open file to be available to the public.
(d) Any person submitting a notice containing information for which they
are asserting a confidentiality claim should send the notice in a double envelope.
(1) The outside envelope should bear the same address outlined in [the
Section 8(e) Statement Interpretation] (Section IX) ....
(2) The inside envelope should be clearly marked "To be opened only by
the OTS Document Control Officer."
Section 8(e) Statement of Interpretation. 43 Fed. Reg. at 11.113. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.201-2.213
(1978) for a detailed description of the general procedures employed by EPA in handling con-
fidential business information.
'24
 EPA issued a proposed rule on January 18, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 2,637, which pro-
posed specific regulations to implement the confidentiality provisions of § 14 of TSCA, 15
U.S.C. § 2613 (1976). While adopting some of the general EPA confidentiality regulations, 40
C.F.R. §§ 2.201-2.313 (1978), the proposed regulations also embody the specific confidentiality
requirements under § 14. Id.
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Once the decision is made to report, the company must he aware of
and prepare for the consequences of reporting. Well-informed manage-
ment can avoid harm to a business' competitive position and serious harm
to the long-term financial viability of the business which could flow from a
section 8(e) report. In, most cases, section 8(e) reports will not result in
either product liability suits or adverse EPA actions. If a company con-
cludes that its chemical does present a substantial risk, however, it. must be
prepared to deal with the problem in a reasoned and expeditious manner.
As EPA acts on more section 8(e) notices and its regulatory policies become
clearer, companies will find it less difficult to make the decision whether a
chemical hazard presents a substantial risk within the meaning of section
8(e).
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